security considerations document
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#!/bin/ruby
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# frozen_string_literal: true
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require 'optionparser'
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if __FILE__ == $0
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text = $stdin.read
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renderer = MDPP::Renderer.new(text, {})
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puts renderer.render
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end
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Security acknowledgements
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=========================
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While special care has been taken to prevent some of the more common common
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vulnerabilities that might arise from using this parser, it does not prevent
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certain issues which **which should be acknowledged**.
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- It is possible to inject a form of one-click XSS into the website. In
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particular, there are no restrictions placed on urls embedded within the links
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(as per the description of CommonMark specification). As such, something as
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simple as `[test](<javascript:dangerous code here>)` would be more than enough
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to employ such an exploit.
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- While generally speaking the parser acts stable on most tests, and precents
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stray HTML tokens from occuring in the output text where appropriate, due to
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the nontrivial nature of the task some form of XSS injection may or may not
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occur. If such an incident occurs, please report it to the current maintainer
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of the project.
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- User input should NOT be trusted when it comes to applying options to
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rendering. Some renderers, such as the HTML renderer, allow modifying the
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style parameter for rendered tags, which when passed control of to an
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untrusted party may become an XSS attack vector.
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